Common sense overcomes the logical difficulties of even the worst systems. Herbart’s remark has, therefore, no practical significance. The philosophy of Spinoza might easily be described by an opponent as “fatalistic,” since it leaves no room for special providences in the physical universe; yet Professor Paulsen, who holds substantially to Spinoza’s view, is one of the most eminent promoters of the theory of education in the university of Berlin. Herbart thought Kant’s doctrine of transcendental will one of absolute volitional caprice, yet the followers of Kant have been among the most energetic promoters of mental and moral training. Herbart thinks he sees in this remark a chance to put his philosophical opponents out of court, to the benefit of his own system. If one philosopher develops a system of “fatalism” and another one of “absolute free will,” the one may be charged with making education impossible and the other with making it futile. In either case, since we know that education is neither impossible nor futile, the presumption is that both systems are defective. This paragraph and others like it are mere indirect methods of defending Herbart’s system of philosophy: they have no real significance for the theory of education itself. 4. On the other hand, the assumption of unlimited plasticity is equally inadmissible; it is for psychology to guard against this error. The educability of the child is, to begin with, limited by his individuality. Then, too, the possibility of determining and moulding him at will through education is lessened by time and circumstances. Lastly, the established character of the adult develops by an inner process which in time passes beyond the reach of the educator. 5. Education seems thus to find a barrier, first, in the order of nature, and later in the pupil’s own will. The difficulty is indeed a real one, if the limitations of education are overlooked: hence an apparent confirmation of fatalism as well as of the doctrine of absolute free will.