Now, independent of the 35 billion marks—nearly 44 billion francs—which were to be imposed on France in the coming war by way of regular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of the hypothetical treaty, outlined the following additional extortion:— ‘France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 billion marks (15 billion francs) lent by her to Russia.’ This means nothing more or less than a cession of credit. On page 308 of Payot’s edition, Tannenberg indicates as follows the use to be made by Germany of these Russian debts to France:— ‘We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany. ‘This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed territories for colonization.’ These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin _Tägliche Rundschau_ thus exposed Germany’s future attitude toward Russia:— ‘If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory which we so sorely need for colonization.’ The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity, written so recently, and Tannenberg’s outline, published six years ago, is indeed striking. Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg’s plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hypothesis.