That in Paulinism two lines of thought go side by side is recognised by almost all the investigators of this period. But in the importance assigned to each of them great divergences appear. Reuss makes the juridical ideas entirely subordinate to the ethical; in Ménégoz the former are more strongly emphasised than the latter. No one except Pfleiderer holds them to be on an exactly equal [pg 032] footing. In general the ethical set of ideas is regarded as the original creation of the Apostle, and is assumed to represent the deepest stratum in his thought. Accordingly, it is generally also held that the doctrine of the abolition of the flesh by the Spirit comes to its full development later than the other, which is based upon the atonement and imputed righteousness. Lüdemann’s theory of a development within the Pauline doctrine is adopted by the majority, though only in a less pronounced form. It should be mentioned that the first important attempt to prove the existence of different phases in the thought and life of Paul was made by Sabatier._(_34_)_ His work _L’Apotre Paul_ appeared in 1870, two years before Lüdemann’s study. At first the Apostle held, according to the French scholar, a simple doctrine which can be psychologically explained from his rabbinic training and his conversion. At the time of his great controversies he was compelled to work out for himself a philosophy of history which would enable him to prove that the law was only a passing episode in the history of salvation, and that justification by faith had always lain in the purpose of God. This doctrine takes a dominant position in the Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans. In the letters written during his imprisonment the Apostle advances to a speculative, gnostic development of his ideas. The coexistence of the juridical and ethical series of ideas does not receive the same prominence in Sabatier as in the later writers, who were influenced by Lüdemann and Pfleiderer. When all is said and done, there is in the works of this period much assertion and little proof regarding the development within Paulinism. One almost gets the impression that the assumption of different stages of thought was chiefly useful as a way of escaping the difficulty about the inner unity of the system. This [pg 033] problem is, however, rather instinctively felt than clearly grasped. The scholars of this period do not feel it incumbent upon them to trace out the connexion in which these disparate sets of ideas must have stood in the view of Paul. They show no surprise at his passing so easily from the one to the other and arguing from each alternately, and they do not ask themselves how he conceived the most general ultimate fact of redemption which underlies both of them. They do not seek to arrive at a really fundamental view of the essence of Paulinism.