A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side, and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody. So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and Denmark. My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian North than around those two small continental States. We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of Germany. But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia. In the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed in many regions. As an example of the effect of these we may mention that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was 50-60 shillings sterling per ton, from the Black Sea to North Europe; but the freightage from California and Australia to Europe, now, hardly exceeds the half. A European war would exercise a paralyzing effect here. Every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will easily understand this. Before the century closes this development will have woven a net of common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of Europe, that, for example, an injury in the foot of Italy may be said to cause pain right up to Norway.