--A neutral State may not permit the war-ships of a belligerent power to run into its ports or (with any other object than to procure provisions, water, coal, etc.) to traverse its sounds, rivers and canals. --Belligerent powers are bound fully to respect the right of peace of the neutral States, and to abstain from any invasion of their territories. --Where a violation of neutral territory has taken place from ignorance of the boundary and not from evil intent, the neutral State shall immediately claim redress, compensation, and the adoption of measures necessary to prevent a similar mistake in future.] [Footnote 15: See in respect of this act, "Recueil des traités, conventions," etc., Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, Part iii. p. 243 Leipzig, 1846.] [Footnote 16: See Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, in the above-named collection, Part iv. p. 575.] [Footnote 17: Respecting the correspondence on this question, see the remainder of "Archives diplomatiques," 1871-72.] [Footnote 18: Motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97. Since the European States have settled into their present grouping, the material preponderance of the great powers over the smaller countries has more and more diminished the possibility of these defending their external liberty and independence by military power only. There are States whose whole male population cannot equal or barely exceed the number, which a great power can command for its fully equipped army. In olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight against a greater and more powerful neighbour. In consequence of the weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly developed art of war, it was then possible. Now this condition is changed. As a rule we find that the military strength of a State is in direct proportion to its population and material wealth. The consequence is that the smaller States have virtually ceased to be belligerent powers. Such examples as Germany's proceeding against Denmark in 1864, and England's against Egypt in 1882, or in general, when the stronger State only needs to consider how large a portion of its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be considered as wars, but as military executions. As to our own country (Sweden), it certainly has, together with Norway, an advantage in its situation above other small powers. But it concerns us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time. This is not to be done by turning Sweden into a military State, because even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against our powerful neighbours. In proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy.