Moreover, what the Superior forget is that that treaty had an instrument put into it intended for its own correction. The Covenant of the League of Nations is a part of the treaty of Versailles and it says very specifically that if at any time in the future any treaty—if that means anything it must include the treaty of Versailles—becomes “inapplicable,” works disturbance between the nations instead of peace, the League may consider it. The belief in political magic on one side and doubt of all new political ventures on the other, made the preliminary days of the Washington Conference hard for the simple-minded observer, prepared to hope for the best and to take no satisfaction in the worst, not to ask more than the conferring powers thought they could safely undertake, to believe that the negotiators would be as honest as we can expect men to be, and that within the serious limits that are always on negotiators, would do their best. One had to ask himself, however, what substantial reasons, if any, he had that the Conference would be able to do the things that it had set down as its business. This business was very concisely laid down in an agenda, divided into two parts and running as follows: _Limitation of Armaments_: (1) Limitation of naval armaments under which shall be discussed the following: (A) Basis of limitation (B) Extent (C) Fulfillment (D) Rules for control of new agencies of warfare (E) Limitation of land armaments. _Far Eastern Questions_: (1) Questions relating to China First. Principles to be applied Second. Application Subjects: (A) Territorial integrity (B) Administrative integrity (C) Open door (D) Concessions, monopolies, preferential privileges (E) Development of railways, including plans relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway (F) Preferential railway rates (G) Status of existing commitments. _Siberia_: Sub-headings the same as those under China. _Mandated Islands_: Sub-headings the same as those under China with railway sections eliminated. What reasons were there for thinking that the nations—England, France, Italy, China, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Portugal—could, with the United States, handle these problems of the Pacific in such a way that they would be able to cut their armaments, and, cutting them, find a satisfactory substitute. There were several reasons.