S. "And they say rightly. But if Lyce, as is her custom, wished, by so saying, to cheat you into believing that she loved you, and thereby to wheedle you out of a new shawl, she would still speak by the spirit of truth?" A. "I suppose so." S. "But if, again, she said the same thing to Phaethon, she would still speak by the spirit of truth?" "By no means, Socrates," said I, laughing. S. "Be silent, fair boy; you are out of court as an interested party. Alcibiades shall answer. If Lyce, being really mad with love, like Sappho, were to believe Phaethon to be fairer than you, and say so, she would still speak by the spirit of truth?" A. "I suppose so." S. "Do not frown; your beauty is in no question. Only she would then be saying what is not true?" "I must answer for him after all," said I. S. "Then it seems, from what has been agreed, that it is indifferent to the spirit of truth, whether it speak truth or not. The spirit seems to be of an enviable serenity. But suppose again, that I believed that Alcibiades had an ulcer on his leg, and were to proclaim the same now to the people, when they come into the Pnyx, should I not be speaking by the spirit of truth?" A. "But that would be a shameful and blackguardly action." S. "Be it so. It seems, therefore, that it is indifferent to the spirit of truth whether that which it affirms be honourable or blackguardly. Is it not so?" A. "It seems so, most certainly, in that case at least." S. "And in others, as I think. But tell me-Is not the man who does what he believes, as much moved by this your spirit of truth as he who says what he believes?" A. "Certainly he is." S. "Then if I believed it right to lie or steal, I, in lying or stealing, should lie or steal by the spirit of truth?" A. "Certainly: but that is impossible." S. "My fine fellow, and wherefore? I have heard of a nation among the Indians who hold it a sacred duty to murder every one not of their own tribe, whom they can waylay: and when they are taken and punished by the rulers of that country, die joyfully under the greatest torments, believing themselves certain of an entrance into the Elysian fields, in proportion to the number of murders which they have committed." A. "They must be impious wretches." S. "Be it so. But believing themselves to be right, they commit murder by the spirit of truth." A. "It seems to follow from the argument." S. "Then it is indifferent to the spirit of truth whether the action which it prompts be right or wrong?" A. "It must be confessed." S. "It is therefore not a moral faculty, this spirit of truth. Let us see now whether it be an intellectual one. How are intellectual things defined, Phaethon? Tell me, for you are cunning in such matters." P. "Those things which have to do with processes of the mind." S. "With right processes, or with wrong?" P. "With right, of course." S. "And processes for what purpose?" P. "For the discovery of facts."