S. "Let us see, then, whether this spirit of truth may not be something which is capable of possessing you, and employing you, rather than of being possessed and employed by you. To me, indeed, this spirit seems likely to be some demon or deity, and that one of the greatest." P. "Why then?" S. "Can lifeless and material things see?" P. "Certainly not; only live ones." S. "This spirit, then, seems to be living; for it sees things as they are." P. "Yes." S. "And it is also intellectual; for intellectual facts can be only seen by an intellectual being." P. "True." S. "And also moral; for moral facts can only be seen by a moral being." P. "True also." S. "But this spirit is evidently not a man; it remains therefore, that it must be some demon." P. "But why one of the greatest?" S. "Tell me, Phaethon, is not God to be numbered among facts as they are?" P. "Assuredly; for he is before all others and more eternal and absolute than all." S. "Then this spirit of truth must also be able to see God as he is." P. "It is probable." S. "And certain, if, as we agreed, it be the very spirit which sees all facts whatsoever as they are. Now tell me, can the less see the greater as it is?" P. "I think not; for an animal cannot see a man as he is, but only that part of him in which he is like an animal, namely, his outward figure and his animal passions; but not his moral sense or reason, for of them it has itself no share." S. "True; and in like wise, a man of less intellect could not see a man of greater intellect than himself as he is, but only a part of his intellect." P. "Certainly." S. "And does not the same thing follow from what we said just now, that God's conceptions of himself must be the only perfect conceptions of him? For if any being could see God as he is, the same would be able to conceive of him as he is: which we agreed was impossible." P. "True." S. "Then surely this spirit which sees God as he is, must be equal with God." P. "It seems probable; but none is equal to God except himself." S. "Most true, Phaethon. But what shall we say now, but that this spirit of truth, whereof thou hast been enamoured, is, according to the argument, none other than Zeus, who alone comprehends all things, and sees them as they are, because he alone has given to each its inward and necessary laws?" P. "But, Socrates, there seems something impious in the thought." S. "Impious, truly, if we held that this spirit of truth was a part of your own self. But we agreed that it was not a part of you, but something utterly independent of you." P. "Noble would the news be, Socrates, were it true; yet it seems to me beyond belief." S. "Did we not prove just now concerning Zeus, that all mistakes concerning him were certain to be mistakes of defect?" P. "We did, indeed."