Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
add no more, but that I unfeignedly remain;
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _In the second Book of the Immortality of the Soul, ch._ 6.
XVI.
_MADAM,_
_Sensation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception follows_, sayes
your _Author_:[1] to which opinion I give no assent, but do believe
that Perception and Sensation are done both at one and the same time,
as being one and the same thing without division, either in reason
or sense, and are performed without any knocks, or jolts, or hitting
against. But let me tell you, _Madam_, there arises a great mistake
by many, from not distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational
Motion; for though all motions are in one onely matter, yet that matter
doth not move always in the same manner, for then there could be no
variety in Nature; and truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may
move diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why may not
Nature? But concerning Motions, and their variety, to avoid tedious
repetitions, I must still referr you to my Book of _Philosophical
Opinions_; I'le add onely this, that it is well to be observed, That
all Motions are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions make
such dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts: Wherefore those, in
my opinion, understand _Nature_ best, which say, that Sensation and
Perception are really one and the same; but they are out, that say,
there can be no communication at a distance, unless by pressing and
crowding; for the patterning of an outward object, may be done without
any inforcement or disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared
heretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the sensitive
and rational parts of matter in one creature, observing the exterior
motions in outward objects, move accordingly, either regularly or
irregularly in patterns; and if they have no exterior objects, as in
dreams, they work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely of their
opinion, who believe, that there is nothing existent in Nature, but
what is purely Corporeal, for this seems most probable in sense and
reason to me,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _In the Pref. of the Imm. of the Soul._
XVII.
_MADAM,_
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account