Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
of the body, and sometimes it happens not once in an age, that the
like figures are repeated, and sometimes they are repeated every
moment: As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the figure of
another man, his friend, with all his qualities, dispositions, actions,
proprieties, and the like, several times in an hour, and sometimes not
once in a year, and so as often as he remembers him, as often is the
figure of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so often is
his figure dissolved. But some imagine the rational motions to be so
gross as the Trotting of a Horse, and that all the motions of Animate
matter are as rude and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that
all impressions must needs make dents or creases. But as Nature hath
degrees of corporeal matter, so she hath also degrees of corporeal
motions, Matter and Motion being but one substance; and it is absurd to
judg of the interior motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or
exterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like the tearing
of a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and patterning of several
figures of rational and sensitive matter must be like the printing of
Books; nay, all artificial Printings are not so hard, as to make dents
and impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like; for they do
not disturb the ground whereon the letters are written, or the picture
drawn, and so the curious actions of the purest rational matter are
neither rude nor rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure,
as not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet certainly it
is dividable, not onely in several Creatures, but in the several parts
of one and the same Creature, as well as the sensitive, which is the
Life of Nature, as the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural
Soul; neither is this Soul Immaterial, but Corporeal; not composed of
raggs and shreds, but it is the purest, simplest and subtillest matter
in Nature. But to conclude, I desire you to remember, _Madam_, that
this rational and sensitive Matter in one united and finite Figure or
particular Creature, has both common and particular actions, for as
there are several kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in
every kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the rational and
sensitive matter in one particular Creature. Also it is to be noted,
That the Parts of rational matter, can more suddenly give and take
Intelligence to and from each other, then the sensitive; nevertheless,
all Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning parts, have Intelligence
between each other, more or less, because all parts make but one body;
for it is not with the parts of Matter, as with several Constables in
several Hundreds, or several Parishes, which are a great way distant
from each other, but they may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet
as partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the Intelligence of
Natures Parts, I have sufficiently spoken in other places; and so I'le
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