Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
particular Creature or part of Nature; as for example, that a Stone or
Tree has animal motions, and doth see, touch, taste, smell and hear by
such sensitive organs as an Animal doth; but, my opinion is, that all
Sense is not bound up to the sensitive organs of an Animal, nor Reason
to the kernel of a man's brain, or the orifice of the stomack, or the
fourth ventricle of the brain, or onely to a mans body; for though we
do not see all Creatures move in that manner as Man or Animals do, as
to walk, run, leap, ride, &c. and perform exterior acts by various
local motions; nevertheless, we cannot in reason say, they are void and
destitute of all motion; For what man knows the variety of motions in
Nature: Do not we see, that Nature is active in every thing, yea, the
least of her Creatures. For example; how some things do unanimously
conspire and agree, others antipathetically flee from each other; and
how some do increase, others decrease; some dissolve, some consist,
and how all things are subject to perpetual changes and alterations;
and do you think all this is done without motion, life, sense, and
reason? I pray you consider, _Madam_, that there are internal motions
as well as external, alterative as well as constitutive; and several
other sorts of motions not perceptible by our senses, and therefore
it is impossible that all Creatures should move after one sort of
motions. But you will say, Motion may be granted, but not Life, Sense,
and Reason. I answer, I would fain know the reason why not; for I am
confident that no man can in truth affirm the contrary: What is Life,
but sensitive Motion? what is Reason, but rational motion? and do you
think, _Madam_, that any thing can move it self without life, sense
and reason? I, for my part, cannot imagine it should; for it would
neither know why, whither, nor what way, or how to move. But you may
reply, Motion may be granted, but not self-motion; and life, sense,
and reason, do consist in self-motion. I answer: this is impossible;
for not any thing in Nature can move naturally without natural motion,
and all natural motion is self-motion. If you say it may be moved by
another; My answer is, first, that if a thing has no motion in it self,
but is moved by another which has self-motion, then it must give that
immovable body motion of its own, or else it could not move, having
no motion at all; for it must move by the power of motion, which is
certain; and then it must move either by its own motion, or by a
communicated or imparted motion; if by a communicated motion, then
the self-moveable thing or body must transfer its own motion into the
immoveable, and lose so much of its own motion as it gives away, which
is impossible, as I have declared heretofore at large, unless it do
also transfer its moving parts together with it, for motion cannot be
transfered without substance. But experience and observation witnesseth
the contrary. Next, I say, if it were possible that one body did
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