Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
say, they are Natural, then I answer they are Material: and thus I do
not deny the existence of Immaterial Spirits, but onely that they are
not parts of Nature, but supernatural; for there may be many things
above Nature, and so above a natural Understanding, and Knowledg,
which may nevertheless have their being and existence, although they
be not Natural, that is, parts of Nature: Neither do I deny that those
supernatural Creatures may be amongst natural Creatures, that is,
have their subsistence amongst them, and in Nature; but they are not
so commixed with them, as the several parts of Matter are, that is,
they do not joyn to the constitution of a material Creature; for no
Immaterial can make a Material, or contribute any thing to the making
or production of it; but such a co-mixture would breed a meer confusion
in Nature: wherefore, it is quite another thing, to be in Nature, or to
have its subsistence amongst natural Creatures in a supernatural manner
or way, and to be a part of Nature. I allow the first to Immaterial
Spirits, but not the second, _viz._ to be parts of Nature. But what
Immaterial Spirits are, both in their Essence or Nature, and their
Essential Properties, it being supernatural, and above natural Reason,
I cannot determine any thing thereof. Neither dare I say, they are
Spirits like as God is, that is, of the same Essence or Nature, no
more then I dare say or think that God is of a humane shape or figure,
or that the Nature of God is as easie to be known as any notion else
whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else
in the world. For if this were so, man would know God as well as he
knows himself, but God and his Attributes are not so easily known as
man may know himself and his own natural Proprieties; for God and
his Attributes are not conceiveable or comprehensible by any humane
understanding, which is not onely material, but also finite; for
though the parts of Nature be infinite in number, yet each is finite
in it self, that is, in its figure, and therefore no natural Creature
is capable to conceive what God is; for he being infinite, there is
also required an infinite capacity to conceive him; Nay, Nature her
self, although she is Infinite, yet cannot possibly have an exact
notion of God, by reason she is Material, and God is Immaterial; and
if the Infinite servant of God is not able to conceive God, much less
will a finite part of Nature do it. Besides, the holy Church doth
openly confess and declare the Incomprehensibility of God, when in the
_Athanasian_ Creed, she expresses, that the Father is Incomprehensible,
the Son Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible, and
that there are not three, but one Incomprehensible God: Therefore, if
any one will prove the contrary, to wit, that God is Comprehensible,
or (which is all one) that God is as easie to be known as any Creature
whatsoever, he surely is more then the Church: But I shall never say or
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