Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
Soul, and therefore called Unanimate; and thus they make the natural
rational soul, and the divine soul in man to be all one thing, without
any distinguishment; but your _Author_ makes a difference between the
Mortal and Immortal soul in Man; the Immortal he calls the Intellect
or Understanding, and the Mortal soul he calls Reason: but to my
judgment he also attributes to the immortal soul, actions which are
both natural, and supernatural, adscribing that to the divine soul,
which onely belongs to the natural, and taking that from the natural,
which properly belongs to her. Besides, he slights and despises the
Rational soul so, as if she were almost of no value with Man, making
her no substance, but a mental intricate and obscure Being, and so far
from Truth, as if there were no affinity betwixt Truth and Reason,
but that they disagree in their very roots, and that the most refined
Reason may be deceitful. But your _Author_, by his leave, confounds
Reason, and Reasoning, which are two several and distinct things; for
reasoning and arguing differs as much from Reason, as doubtfulness
from certainty of knowledg, or a wavering mind from a constant mind;
for Reasoning is the discoursive, and Reason the understanding part in
Man, and therefore I can find no great difference between Understanding
and Reason: Neither can I be perswaded, that Reason should not remain
with Man after this life, and enter with him into Heaven, although
your _Author_ speaks much against it; for if Man shall be the same
then, which he is now, in body, why not in soul also? 'Tis true, the
Scripture says, he shall have a more glorious body; but it doth not
say, that some parts of the body shall be cast away, or remain behind;
and if not of the body, why of the soul? Why shall Reason, which is
the chief part of the natural Soul, be wanting? Your _Author_ is much
for Intellect or Understanding; but I cannot imagine how Understanding
can be without Reason. Certainly, when he saw the Immortal Soul in
a Vision, to be a formal Light, how could he discern what he saw,
without Reason? How could he distinguish between Light and Darkness,
without Reason? How could he know the Image of the Mind to be the Image
of God, without the distinguishment of Reason? You will say, Truth
informed him, and not Reason. I answer, Reason shews the Truth. You
may reply, Truth requires no distinguishment or judgment. I grant,
that perfect Truth requires not reasoning or arguing, as whether it
be so, or not; but yet it requires reason, as to confirm it to be so,
or not so; for Reason is the confirmation of Truth, and Reasoning is
but the Inquisition into Truth: Wherefore, when our Souls shall be in
the fulness of blessedness, certainly, they shall not be so dull and
stupid, but observe distinctions between God, Angels, and sanctified
Souls; as also, that our glory is above our merit, and that there is
great difference between the Damned, and the Blessed, and that God is
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