When your Author discourseth of the use of _Speech or Words and Names_, he is pleas'd to say,[1] _That their use is to serve for marks and notes of Remembrance_; Whereof to give you my opinion, I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf and dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take a Bird, and teach him to speak, if he had not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never learn them. You will ask me, _Madam_, What then, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things without words, although your Author denies it: But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature before God, Discord before Unity and Concord. Again, your _Author_, in his Chapter of Reason,[2] defines _Reason_ to be nothing else but _Reckoning_: I answer, That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter, works variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various and divers effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy, Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment, Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more: Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part, nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves more variously then in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings, Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c. but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular, according to the motions of Reason or Rational part of animate matter; and though some rational parts may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several