Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
Concerning your Learned Authors discourse of Density and Rarity, he
defines[1] _Thick to be that, which takes up more parts of a space
given; and thin, which containes fewer parts of the same magnitude: not
that there is more matter in one place then in an other equal place,
but a greater quantity of some named body; wherefore the multitude and
paucity of the parts contained within the same space do constitute
density and rarity._ Whereof my opinion is, That there is no more nor
less space or place then body according to its dilation or contraction,
and that space and place are dilated and contracted with the body,
according to the magnitude of the body, for body, place and magnitude
are the same thing, only place is in regard of the several parts of the
body, and there is as well space betwixt things distant a hairs breadth
from one another, as betwixt things distant a million of miles, but yet
this space is nothing from the body; but it makes, that that body has
not the same place with this body, that is, that this body is not that
body, and that this bodies place is not that bodies place. Next your
_Author_ sayes,[2] _He hath already clearly enough demonstrated, that
there can be no beginning of motion, but from an external and moved
body, and that heavy bodies being once cast upwards cannot be cast
down again, but by external motion._ Truly, _Madam_, I will not speak
of your _Authors_ demonstrations, for it is done most by art, which I
have no knowledg in, but I think I have probably declared, that all
the actions of nature are not forced by one part, driving, pressing,
or shoving another, as a man doth a wheel-barrow, or a whip a horse;
nor by reactions, as if men were at foot-ball or cuffs, or as men with
carts meeting each other in a narrow lane. But to prove there is no
self-motion in nature, he goes on and says; _To attribute to created
bodies the power to move themselves, what is it else, then to say that
there be creatures which have no dependance upon the Creator?_ To which
I answer, That if man (who is but a single part of nature) hath given
him by God the power and a free will of moving himself, why should
not God give it to Nature? Neither can I see, how it can take off the
dependance upon God, more then Eternity; for, if there be an Eternal
Creator, there is also an Eternal Creature, and if an Eternal Master,
an Eternal Servant, which is Nature; and yet Nature is subject to Gods
Command, and depends upon him; and if all Gods Attributes be Infinite,
then his Bounty is Infinite also, which cannot be exercised but by an
Infinite Gift, but a Gift doth not cause a less dependance. I do not
say, That man hath an absolute Free-will, or power to move, according
to his desire; for it is not conceived, that a part can have an
absolute power: nevertheless his motion both of body and mind is a free
and self-motion, and such a self-motion hath every thing in Nature
according to its figure or shape; for motion and figure, being inherent
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