Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
wise, (although your _Author_ denies it, calling those Fools that
maintain this opinion)[2] yet it cannot go beyond the rules of its
Nature, no more then any Art can go beyond its Rules and Principles:
And as for what your _Author_ says, That every thing would approach to
that, which is agreeable and pleasant; I think I need no demonstration
to prove it; for we may plainly see it in all effects of Nature, that
there is Sympathy and Antipathy, and what is this else, but approaching
to things agreeable and pleasant, and withdrawing it self from things
disagreeable, and hurtful or offensive? But of this subject I shall
discourse more hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest,
Madam,
_Your Faithful Friend_
_and Servant._
[1] _Of the Immortality of the Soul, l._ 2., _c._ 1. _a._ 3.
[2] _In the Append. to the Antid. c._ 3. _a._ 10.
IX.
_MADAM,_
Your _Authors_ opinion is,[1] That _Matter being once actually divided
as far as possibly it can, it is a perfect contradiction it should
be divided any further._ I answer, Though Nature is Infinite, yet
her actions are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide and
some compose, some dilate and some contract, which causes a mean
betwixt Natures actions or motions. Next your _Author_ says, That
_as Infinite Greatness has no Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath
none also._ I answer, Whatsoever hath a body, has a figure; for it
is impossible that _substance_, or _body_, and _figure_, should be
separated from each other, but wheresoever is body or substance,
there is also figure, and if there be an infinite substance, there
must also be an infinite figure, although not a certain determined
or circumscribed figure, for such a figure belongs onely to finite
particulars; and therefore I am of your _Authors_ mind, That it is a
contradiction to say an Infinite Cube or Triangle, for a Cube and a
Triangle is a perfect circumscribed figure, having its certain compass
and circumference, be it never so great or little; wherefore to say
an Infinite Cube, would be as much as to say a Finite Infinite. But
as for your _Authors_ example of _Infinite matter, space or duration,
divided into three equal parts, all which he says must needs be
Infinite, or else the whole will not be so, and then the middle part
of them will seem both Finite and Infinite._ I answer, That Matter is
not dividable into three equal parts, for three is a finite number
and so are three equal parts; but I say that Matter being an Infinite
body, is dividable into Infinite parts, and it doth not follow, as
your _Author_ says, That one of those infinite parts must be infinite
also, for else there would be no difference betwixt the whole and its
parts; I say whole for distinctions and better expressions sake, and
do not mean such a whole which hath a certain number of parts, and
is of a certain and limited figure, although never so great; but an
Infinite whole, which expression I must needs use, by reason I speak
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