PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES By G. E. MOORE, Litt.D. _Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), F.B.A._ _Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge Author of "Principia Ethica"_ LONDON ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4 1922 CONTENTS I. THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM II. THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION III. WILLIAM JAMES' "PRAGMATISM" IV. HUME'S PHILOSOPHY V. THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA VI. THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY VII. SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION VIII. THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE IX. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS X. THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY _Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously published, originally appeared as follows_:-- I. "The Refutation of Idealism" in _Mind,_ N.S. Vol. xii, 1903. II. "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1905-6. III. "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1907-8. IV. "Hume's Philosophy" in _The New Quarterly,_ November, 1909. V. "The Status of Sense-Data" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1913-14. VI. "The Conception of Reality" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1917-18. VII. "Some Judgments of Perception" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1918-19. IX. "External and Internal Relations" in _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,_ 1919-20. PREFACE All the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones (VIII and X), have been previously published; and of those which have been previously published all, except that on "External and Internal Relations" (IX), are here re-printed without change. They were written at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the order in which they were written, except that VIII on "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," which was written earlier than VI and VII, has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject. All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers; but I hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I have done so, have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly what I mean by them. The tone of X is somewhat different from that of the rest, because it was written as a lecture for the _Leicester Philosophical Society_, with regard to which I was informed that I must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience. It accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended.