I am _not_ asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of being thought of by me both belong to one and the same thing; whereas, in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a lion and of being hunted by me _do_ belong to one and the same thing. It is quite clear that there is _in fact_, this difference between the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover, _exactly_ what _is_ meant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the hypothesis that there Is something which possesses it, and (2) that the property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not give us completely what is _meant_ by the statement, "I am thinking of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is certainly _not_ that I am conceiving with regard to the property of "being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point which concerns us is that it is certainly _not_ necessary for its truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sense whatever _be_ a unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr. Bradley is that of supposing that, _in some sense,_ it must imply this latter. This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the reasons which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the proposition "Time is unreal," _must_ be consistent with the proposition "There _is_ such a thing as Time." Put shortly, it is that he sees (what is perfectly true) that "Time is unreal" _must_ be consistent with "We do think of Time;" he thinks (falsely) that "We _do_ think of Time" must imply, in some sense, "There _is_ such a thing as Time;" and finally, infers (correctly) from this true and this false premiss, that there _must_ be some sense of the proposition "There is such a thing as Time" which is consistent with "Time is unreal."