It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought mean _both_ by "Time is unreal" _and_ by "Time exists," he is contradicting himself when he combines these two propositions. And I have said I feel convinced that he _does_ mean what he ought to mean by the former. But I feel a good deal of doubt as to whether, all the same, he is contradicting himself, because it does seem to me doubtful whether he means what he ought to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that Time _does_ exist, _is a fact,_ and _is,_ is that, properly speaking, he is not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever--_not,_ therefore, that which they properly bear. It seems to me very possible that he has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there _must_ be _some_ sense in which, if I think of a unicorn, there must _be_ a unicorn, that wherever he knows the former proposition holds, he allows himself to use the latter _form of words,_ without attaching any meaning to them. What he is really asserting so emphatically may, I think, be not anything which his words stand for, but simply this verbal proposition that there _must_ be _some_ sense in which they are true. [1] _Appearance and Reality_ (2nd edn.), p. 35. The Italics are mine. [2] _Op. cit._ pp. 131-2. SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION I want to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we are doing when we make judgments of a certain kind, which we all do in fact exceedingly commonly make. The kind of judgments I mean are those which we make when, with regard to something which we are seeing, we judge such things as '"That is an inkstand," "That is a tablecloth," "That is a door," etc., etc.; or when, with regard to something which we are feeling with our hands, we judge such things as "This is cloth," "This is a finger," "This is a coin," etc., etc.