tell, perceptibly different from that object which was presented to me just now," for the simple reason that I _can_ tell, as certainly, almost, as I can tell anything, that it is perceptibly different. That is the argument, as well as I can put it, for saying that this presented object, is _not_ identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand; and that, therefore, when I judge "This is part of the surface of an inkstand," I am not judging of this presented object, which nevertheless is the ultimate subject of my judgment, that _it_ is part of the surface of an inkstand. And this argument does seem to me to be a very powerful one. But nevertheless it does not seem to me to be quite conclusive, because it rests on an assumption, which, though it seems to me to have great force, does not seem to me quite certain. The assumption I mean is the assumption that, in such cases as those I have spoken of, the later presented object really is perceptibly different from the earlier. This assumption has, if I am not mistaken, seemed to many philosophers to be quite unquestionable; they have never even thought of questioning it; and I own that it used to be so with me. And I am still not sure that I may not be talking sheer nonsense in suggesting that it can be questioned. But, if I am, I am no longer able to see that I am. What now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which corresponds to a tree, which I am seeing, when I am a mile off, may not really be perceived to _be_ smaller than the one, which corresponds to the same tree, when I see it from a distance of only a hundred yards, but that it is only perceived to _seem_ smaller; that the sense-datum which corresponds to a penny, which I am seeing obliquely, is not really perceived to _be_ different in shape from that which corresponded to the penny, when I was straight in front of it, but is only perceived to _seem_ different--that all that is perceived is that the one _seems_ elliptical and the other circular; that the sense-datum presented to me when I have the blue spectacles on is not perceived to _be_ different in colour from the one presented to me when I have not, but only to _seem_ so; and finally that the sense-datum presented when I touch this finger is not perceived to _be_ different in any way from that presented to me when I see it, but only to _seem_ so that I do not perceive the one to be coloured and the other not to be so, but only that the one _seems_ coloured and the other not. If such a view is to be possible, we shall have, of course, to maintain that the kind of experience which I have expressed by saying one _seems_ different from the other_--"seems_ circular," _"seems_ blue," _"seems_ coloured," and so on--involves an ultimate, not further analysable, kind of psychological relation, not to be identified either with that involved in being "perceived" to be so and so, or with that involved in being "judged" to be so and so; since a presented object might, in