this sense, _seem_ to be elliptical, _seem_ to be blue, etc., when it is neither perceived to be so, nor judged to be so. But there seems to me to be no reason why there should not be such an ultimate relation. The great objection to such a view seems to me to be the difficulty of believing that I don't actually perceive this sense-datum to _be_ red, for instance, and that other to _be_ elliptical; that I only perceive, in many cases, that it _seems_ so. I cannot, however, now persuade myself that it is quite clear that I do perceive it to _be_ so. And, if I don't, then it seems really possible that this presented object really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand; since, when I judge, as in the cases supposed, that the surface in question is _not_, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different from what it was, I might really be judging of the two sense-data that they also were not, so far as I can tell, perceptibly different, the only difference between the two that _is_ perceptible, being that the one _seems_ to be of a certain size, shape or colour, and the other to be of a different and incompatible size, shape or colour. Of course, in those cases, as in that of the balloon being blown up, where I "perceive" that the surface has changed, _e.g._ in size, it would have to be admitted that I do perceive of the two sense-data not merely that they _seem_ different in size, but that they _are_ so. But I think it would be possible to maintain that the sense in which, in these cases, I "perceive" them to _be_ different, is a different one from that in which, both in these and in the others, I perceive them to _seem_ so. Possibly in making this suggestion that sense-data, in cases where most philosophers have assumed unhesitatingly that they are _perceived_ to be different, are only really perceived to _seem_ different, I am, as I said, talking sheer nonsense, though I cannot, at the moment, see that I am. And possibly, even if this suggestion itself is not nonsense, even if it is true, there may be other fatal objections to the view that this presented object really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. But what seems to me certain is that, unless this suggestion is true, then this presented object is certainly _not_ identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. And since it is doubtful whether it is not nonsense, and still more doubtful whether it is true, it must, I think, be admitted to be highly doubtful whether the two _are_ identical. But, if they are not identical, then what I am judging with regard to this presented object, when I judge "This is an inkstand," is certainly _not_ that it is itself part of the surface of an inkstand; and hence, it is worth while to inquire further, what, if I am not judging this, I _can_ be judging with regard to it.