adds to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the unconditional "must," since, in this case, there would be two different meanings of "must," both unconditional, and yet neither, apparently, identical with the logical "must." EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS [Propositions and terms surrounded by "°" are "over-ligned" in original.] In the index to _Appearance and Reality_ (First Edition) Mr. Bradley declares that _all_ relations are "intrinsical"; and the following are some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means by this assertion. "A relation must at both ends _affect,_ and pass into, the being of its terms" (p. 364). "Every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical" (p. 392). "To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question" (p. 142). And a good many other philosophers seem inclined to take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is here trying to express. Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, or a part of it, are these: "No relations are purely external"; "All relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold"; "No terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms." (See _e.g.,_ Joachim, _The Nature of Truth,_ pp. 11, 12, 46). It is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what these philosophers mean by these assertions. And the main object of this paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, which, even if it does not give the whole of what they mean, seems to me to be always implied by what they mean, and to be certainly false. I shall try to make clear the exact meaning of this proposition, to point out some of its most important consequences, and to distinguish it clearly from certain other propositions which are, I think, more or less liable to be confused with it. And I shall maintain that, if we give to the assertion that a relation is "internal" the meaning which this proposition would give to it, then, though, in that sense, _some_ relations are "internal," others, no less certainly, are not, but are "purely external." To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting on one side two propositions about relations, which, though they seem sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing, do, I think, quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that view.