The first is a proposition which is quite certainly and obviously true of all relations, without exception, and which, though it raises points of great difficulty, can, I think, be clearly enough stated for its truth to be obvious. It is the proposition that, in the case of any relation whatever, the kind of fact which we express by saying that a given term A has that relation to another term B, or to a pair of terms B and C, or to three terms B, C, and D, and so on, in no case simply consists in the terms in question _together with_ the relation. Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was father of George V, obviously does not simply consist in Edward, George, _and_ the relation of fatherhood. In order that the fact may be, it is obviously not sufficient that there should merely be George and Edward and the relation of fatherhood; it is further necessary that the relation should _relate_ Edward to George, and not only so, but also that it should relate them in the particular way which we express by saying that Edward was father of George, and not merely in the way which we should express by saying that George was father of Edward. This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations without exception: and the only reason why I have mentioned it is because, in an article in which Mr. Bradley criticises Mr. Russell (_Mind,_ 1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is inconsistent with the proposition that any relations are merely external, and because, so far as I can make out, some other people who maintain that all relations are internal seem sometimes to think that their contention follows from this proposition. The way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that such facts are unities which are not _completely analysable_; and this is, of course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such fact is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say: This fact is _identical with_ these constituents. But whether from this it follows that all relations are internal must of course depend upon what is meant by the latter statement. If it be merely used to express this proposition itself, or anything which follows from it, then, of course, there can be no doubt that all relations are internal. But I think there is no doubt that those who say this do not mean by their words _merely_ this obvious proposition itself; and I am going to point out something which I think they always imply, and which certainly does _not_ follow from it.