with the question whether all relations are internal, for the simple reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition with regard to _all_ relations without exception. It asserts with regard to all relational properties of a certain kind, that they have a certain kind of _effect_; and no proposition of this sort can, I think follow from any universal proposition with regard to _all_ relations. We have, therefore, rejected as certainly not giving the whole meaning of the dogma that all relations are internal: (1) the obviously true proposition that no relational facts are _completely_ analysable, in the precise sense which I gave to that assertion; and (2) the obviously false proposition that all relations modify their terms, in the natural sense of the term "modify," in which it always has as part of its meaning "cause to undergo a change." And we have also seen that this false proposition that any relation which a term comes to have always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the question whether _all_ relations are internal or not. We have seen finally that if the assertion that all relations modify their terms is to be understood as equivalent to the assertion that all are internal, "modify" must be understood in some metaphorical sense. The question is: What is this metaphorical sense? And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is obvious that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may have the relation in question, not only to one other term, but to several different terms. If, for instance, we consider the relation of fatherhood, it is obvious that a man may be father, not only of one, but of several different children. And those who say that all relations modify their terms always mean, I think, not merely that every different relation which a term has modifies it; but also that, where the relation is one which the term has to several different other terms, then, in the case of _each_ of these terms, it is modified by the fact that it has the relation in question to that particular term. If, for instance, A is father of three children, B, C, and D, they mean to assert that he is modified, not merely by being a father, but by being the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by being the father of D. The mere assertion that all _relations_ modify their terms does not, of course, make it quite clear that this is what is meant; but I think there is no doubt that it is always meant; and I think we can express it more clearly by using a term, which I have already introduced, and saying the doctrine is that all _relational properties_ modify their terms, in a sense which remains to be defined. I think there is no difficulty in understanding what I mean by a _relational property._ If A is father of B, then what you assert of A when you say that he is so is a _relational property_--namely the property of being father of B; and it is quite clear that this