property is not itself a _relation_, in the same fundamental sense in which the relation of fatherhood is so; and also that, if C is a different child from B, then the property of being father of C is a different relational property from that of being father of B, although there is only _one_ relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are derived. So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of all _relations_ being internal, often actually mean by "relations" "relational properties"; when they talk of all the "relations" of a given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not merely all the different relations, of each of which it is true that the term has that relation to something. It will, I think, conduce to clearness to use a different word for these two entirely different uses of the term "relation" to call "fatherhood" a relation, and "fatherhood of B" a "relational property." And the fundamental proposition, which is meant by the assertion that all relations are internal, is, I think, a proposition with regard to relational properties, and not with regard to relations properly so-called. There is no doubt that those who maintain this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them--that they modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical sense. And once we have defined what this sense is in which a _relational property_ can be said to be internal to a term which possesses it, we can easily derive from it a corresponding sense in which the _relations_, strictly so called, from which relational properties are derived, can be said to be internal.