It being the case, then, that the sensation of blue includes in its analysis, beside blue, _both_ a unique element 'awareness' _and_ a unique relation of this element to blue, I can make plain what I meant by asserting, as two distinct propositions, (1) that blue is probably not part of the content of the sensation at all, and (2) that, even it were, the sensation would nevertheless not be the sensation _of_ blue, if blue had only this relation to it. The first hypothesis may now be expressed by saying that, if it were true, then, when the sensation of blue exists, there exists a _blue awareness_: offence may be taken at the expression, but yet it expresses just what should be and is meant by saying that blue is, in this case, a _content_ of consciousness or experience. Whether or not, when I have the sensation of blue, my consciousness or awareness is thus blue, my introspection does not enable me to decide with certainty: I only see no reason for thinking that it is. But whether it is or not, the point is unimportant, for introspection _does_ enable me to decide that something else is also true: namely that I am aware _of_ blue, and by this I mean, that my awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation. It is possible, I admit, that my awareness is blue _as well_ as being _of_ blue: but what I am quite sure of is that it is _of_ blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter. And this result I may express by saying that what is called the _content_ of a sensation is in very truth what I originally called it--the sensation's _object._ But, if all this be true, what follows?