I want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of "internal," (p. 286) in which to say that P is internal to A means not merely that anything which had not P would necessarily be _other_ than A, but that it would necessarily be _qualitatively_ different. I said that this was the meaning of "internal" in which the dogma of internal relations holds that all relational properties are "internal"; and that one of the most important consequences which followed from it, was that all relational properties are "internal" in the less extreme sense that we have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there is another important consequence which also follows from it, namely, the Identity of Indiscernibles. For if it be true, in the case of every relational property, that any term which had net that property would necessarily be qualitatively different from any which had, it follows of course that, in the case of two terms one of which has a relational property, which the other has not the two are qualitatively different. But, from the proposition that _x_ is other than _y,_ it _does_ follow that _x_ has some relational property which _y_ has not; and hence, if the dogma of internal relations be true, it will follow that if _x_ is other than _y, x_ is always also qualitatively different from _y,_ which is the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This is, of course, a further objection to the dogma of internal relations, since I think it is obvious that the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is not true. Indeed, so far as I can see, the dogma of internal relations essentially consists in the joint assertion of two indefensible propositions: (1) the proposition that in the case of no relational property is it true of any term which has got that property, that it _might_ not have had it and (2) the Identity of Indiscernibles.