I want, finally, to say something about the phrase which Mr. Russell uses in the _Philosophical Essays_ to express the dogma of internal relations. He says it may be expressed in the form "Every relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms" (p. 160). And it can be easily seen, if the account which I have given be true, in what precise sense it does hold this. Mr. Russell is uncertain as to whether by "the nature" of a term is to be understood the term itself or something else. For my part it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant, not the term itself, but what may roughly be called all its qualities as distinguished from its relational properties. But whichever meaning we take, it will follow from what I have said, that the dogma of internal relations does imply that every relational property which a term has is, in a perfectly precise sense, _grounded_ in its nature. It will follow that every such property is _grounded_ in _the term,_ in the sense that, in the case of every such property, it _follows_ from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the property in question. And it will also follow that any such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has, in the sense, that if you take _all_ the qualities which the term has, it will again follow in the case of each relational property, from the proposition that the term has _all_ those qualities that it has the relational property in question; since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of any such property, any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different in quality from the term in question. In both of these two senses, then, the dogma of internal relations does, I think, imply that every relational property is grounded in the nature of every term which possesses it; and in this sense that proposition is false. Yet it is worth noting, I think, that there is another sense of "grounded" in which it may quite well be true that every relational property _is_ grounded in the nature of any term which possesses it. Namely that, in the case of every such property, the term in question has some quality _without_ which it could not have had the property. In other words that the relational property _entails_ some quality in the term, though no quality in the term _entails_ the relational property. THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY