that spirit does--are, if we have no reason for believing in matter, as baseless as the grossest superstitions. [1] _International Journal of Ethics,_ October, 1902. THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION There are two beliefs in which almost all philosophers, and almost all ordinary people are agreed. Almost everyone believes that he himself and what he directly perceives do not constitute the whole of reality: he believes that _something_ other than himself and what he directly perceives _exists_ or is _real._ I do not mean to say that almost everyone believes that what he directly perceives is real: I only mean that he does believe that, whether what he directly perceives is real or not, something other than it and other than himself certainly is so. And not only does each of us thus agree in believing that _something_ other than himself and what he directly perceives is real: almost everyone also believes that _among_ the real things, other than himself and what he directly perceives, are other persons who have thoughts and perceptions in some respects similar to his own. That most people believe this I think I need scarcely try to show. But since a good many philosophers may appear to have held views contradictory of this one, I will briefly point out my reason for asserting that most philosophers, even among those (if any) who have believed the contradictory of this, have yet held this as well. Almost all philosophers tell us something about the nature of _human_ knowledge and _human_ perception. They tell us that _we_ perceive so and so; that the nature or origin of _our_ perceptions is such and such; or (as I have just been telling you) that men in general have such and such beliefs. It might, indeed, be said that we are not to interpret such language too strictly: that, though a philosopher talks about _human_ knowledge and _our_ perceptions, he only means to talk about his own. But in many cases a philosopher will leave no doubt upon this point, by expressly assuming that there are other perceptions, which differ in some respects from his own: such, for instance, is the case when (as is so common nowadays) a philosopher introduces psycho-genetic considerations into his arguments --considerations concerning the nature of the perceptions of men who existed before and at a much lower stage of culture than himself. Any philosopher, who uses such arguments, obviously assumes that perceptions other than his own have existed or been real. And even those philosophers who think themselves justified in the conclusion that neither their own perceptions nor any perceptions like theirs are _ultimately_ real, would, I think admit, that _phenomenally_, at least, they _are_ real, and are certainly _more_ real than some other things.