in the existence of any such material objects. All the arguments by
which I have tried to show that this kind of observation alone can give
me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of perception
or feeling in another person, apply, with at least equal force, to
show that it can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any
kind of material object. On the other hand, if we are to admit the
principle that "Beliefs which lead to true predictions, are generally
true," this principle will give us at least as much reason to believe
in the existence of certain kinds of material objects as to believe
in the existence of other persons; since one of the most remarkable
facts about beliefs in the existence of such objects is that they do so
often lead to true predictions. But it must be remembered that we can
have no reason for believing this principle itself, _unless_ our own
perceptions, thoughts and feelings are _not_ the only kind of observed
"content" which really does exist: we can have no reason for it, unless
some such things as what I perceive, when I see a red and blue book
side by side, do really exist.
It would seem, therefore, that if my own observations do give me any
reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception
in any other person or of any material object, it must be true that
not only my own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also _some_ of
the other kinds of things which I directly perceive--colours, sounds,
smells, etc.--do really exist: it must be true that some objects of
this kind _exist_ or are _real_ in precisely the same simple sense
in which my perceptions of them exist or are real. Is there then any
reason to think that this is not true? Is there any reason to think,
for instance, that _none_ of the colours which I perceive as occupying
areas of certain shapes and sizes really exist in the areas which
they appear to occupy? This is a question which I wished to discuss
at length, because I think that it is one in which there are real
difficulties. But I have given so much space to other questions, that I
can only deal with it very briefly here.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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