the case of sensible qualities which appear to be at a great distance
from us. When, for instance, (as we say), "we see the moon," _what_
we perceive (if the moon be full) is a round bright silver disc, of
a small size, at a place very distant from us. Does that silver disc
exist at that place? With what suppositions does the assumption that
it _does_ conflict? Only, so far as I can see, with the supposition
that the place in question is _really_ occupied by a body such as
science has taught us to suppose that the moon _really_ is--a spherical
body immensely larger than objects, in comparison with which the
silver disc which we perceive is small; _or else_ with the supposition
that the place in question is really occupied by some part of our
atmosphere, or some part of the medium which science supposes to exist
between our atmosphere and the moon; _or else_ with the supposition
that the place in question is really occupied by what we might see,
if the moon were nearer to us by many thousands of miles. Unless we
suppose that some other object _is_ in the place, in which the silver
disc appears to be, and that this object is of a kind which cannot
occupy the _same_ place which is occupied by a silver disc, we have
no reason to suppose that the silver disc does _not_ really exist in
the place where it appears to be. And, in this case, we _perhaps_ have
reason for both suppositions and should therefore conclude that the
silver disc, which we perceive, does not exist in any real place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account