Professor James is plainly anxious to assert _some_ connection between truth and "verification" or "utility." And that there is _some_ connection between them everybody will admit. That _many_ of our true ideas are verified; that _many_ of them can be verified; and that _many_ of them are useful, is, I take it, quite indisputable. But Professor James seems plainly to wish to assert something more than this. And one more thing which he wishes to assert is, I think, pretty plain. He suggests, at the beginning of Lecture VI, that he is going to tell us in what sense it is that our true ideas "agree with reality." Truth, he says, certainly _means_ their agreement with reality; the only question is as to what we are to understand by the words "agreement" and "reality" in this proposition. And he first briefly considers the theory, that the sense in which our true ideas agree with reality, is that they "copy" some reality. And he affirms that some of our true ideas really do do this. But he rejects the theory, as a theory of what truth means, on the ground that they do not _all_ do so. Plainly, therefore, he implies that no theory of what truth _means_ will be correct, unless it tells us of some property which belongs to _all_ our true ideas without exception. But his own theory is a theory of what truth means. Apparently, therefore, he wishes to assert that not only many but _all_ our true ideas are or can be verified; that _all_ of them are useful. And it is, I think, pretty plain that this is _one_ of the things which he wishes to assert.