Apparently, therefore, Professor James wishes to assert that _all_ our true ideas are or can be verified--that _all_ are useful. And certainly this is not a truism like the proposition that _many_ of them are so. Even if this were all that he meant, it would be worth discussing. But even this, I think, is not all. The very first proposition in which he expresses his theory is the following. "True ideas," he says (p. 201) "are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot." And what does this mean? Let us, for brevity's sake, substitute the word "verify" alone for the four words which Professor James uses, as he himself subsequently seems to do. He asserts, then, that true ideas are _those which_ we can verify. And plainly he does not mean by this merely that _some_ of the ideas which we can verify are true, while plenty of others, which we can verify, are not true. The plain meaning of his words is that _all_ the ideas which we can verify are true. No one would use them who did not mean this. Apparently, therefore, Professor James means to assert not merely that we can verify all our true ideas; but also that all the ideas, which we can verify, are true. And so, too, with utility or usefulness. He seems to mean not merely that all our true ideas are useful; but that all those which are useful are true. This would follow, for one thing, from the fact that he seems to use the words "verification" or "verifiability" and "usefulness" as if they came to the same thing. But, in this case too, he asserts it in words that have but one plain meaning. "The true" he says (p. 222) "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking." "The true" is _the_ expedient: that is, _all_ expedient thinking is true. Or again: "An idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives" (p. 75). That is to say, _every_ idea, which is profitable to our lives, is, while it is so, true. These words certainly have a plain enough meaning. Apparently, therefore, Professor James means to assert not merely that all true ideas are useful, but also that all useful ideas are true. Professor James' words, then, do at least suggest that he wishes to assert all four of the following propositions. He wishes to assert, it would seem-- (1) That we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true. (2) That all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true. (3) That all our true ideas are useful. (4) That all those of our ideas, which are useful, are true.