Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
From these principles we may account for a phenomenon in the passions,
which at first sight seems very extraordinary, viz. that surprise is
apt to change into fear, and every thing that is unexpected affrights
us. The most obvious conclusion from this is, that human nature is
in general pusillanimous; since, upon the sudden appearance of any
object, we immediately conclude it to be an evil, and, without waiting
till we can examine its nature, whether it be good or bad, are at
first affected with fear. This, I say, is the most obvious conclusion;
but upon farther examination, we shall find that the phenomenon is
otherwise to be accounted for. The suddenness and strangeness of an
appearance naturally excite a commotion in the mind, like every thing
for which we are not prepared, and to which we are not accustomed. This
commotion, again, naturally produces a curiosity or inquisitiveness,
which, being very violent, from the strong and sudden impulse of
the object, becomes uneasy, and resembles in its fluctuation and
uncertainty, the sensation of fear, or the mixed passions of grief and
joy. This image of fear naturally converts into the thing itself, and
gives us a real apprehension of evil, as the mind always forms its
judgments more from its present disposition than from the nature of its
objects.
Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a strong connexion with fear, even
though they do not cause any opposition of passions by the opposite
views and considerations they present to us. A person who has left his
friend in any malady, will feel more anxiety upon his account, than if
he were present, though perhaps he is not only incapable of giving him
assistance, but likewise of judging of the event of his sickness. In
this case, though the principle object of the passion, viz. the life or
death of his friend, be to him equally uncertain when present as when
absent; yet there are, a thousand little circumstances of his friend's
situation and condition, the knowledge of which fixes the idea, and
prevents that fluctuation and uncertainty so nearly allied to fear.
Uncertainty is, indeed, in one respect, as nearly allied to hope as to
fear, since it makes an essential part in the composition of the former
passion; but the reason why it inclines not to that side, is, that
uncertainty alone is uneasy, and has a relation of impressions to the
uneasy passions.
'Tis thus our uncertainty concerning any minute circumstance relating
to a person, increases our apprehensions of his death or misfortune.
Horace has remarked this phenomenon:
Ut assidens implumibus pullus avis
Serpentium allapsus timet,
Magis relictis; non, ut adsit, auxili
Latura plus presentibus.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account