Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
But before we proceed farther in this subject, and examine particularly
all the causes of pride and humility, 'twill be proper to make some
limitations to the general system, _that all agreeable objects, related
to ourselves by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce
pride, and disagreeable ones, humility_: and these limitations are
derived from the very nature of the subject.
I. Suppose an agreeable object to acquire a relation to self, the
first passion that appears on this occasion is joy; and this passion
discovers itself upon a slighter relation than pride and vain-glory.
We may feel joy upon being present at a feast, where our senses are
regaled with delicacies of every kind: but 'tis only the master of
the feast, who, beside the same joy, has the additional passion of
self-applause and vanity. 'Tis true, men sometimes boast of a great
entertainment, at which they have only been present; and by so small
a relation convert their pleasure into pride: but however this must in
general be owned, that joy arises from a more inconsiderable relation
than vanity, and that many things, which are too foreign to produce
pride, are yet able to give us a delight and pleasure. The reason
of the difference may be explained thus. A relation is requisite to
joy, in order to approach the object to us, and make it give us any
satisfaction. But beside this, which is common to both passions,
'tis requisite to pride, in order to produce a transition from one
passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity. As it
has a double task to perform, it must be endowed with double force and
energy. To which we may add, that where agreeable objects bear not
a very close relation to ourselves, they commonly do to some other
person; and this latter relation not only excels, but even diminishes,
and sometimes destroys the former, as we shall see afterwards.[2]
Here then is the first limitation we must make to our general position,
_that every thing related to us, which produces pleasure or pain,
produces likewise pride or humility_. There is not only a relation
required, but a close one, and a closer than is required to joy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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