Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence
of general rules and maxims on the passions very much contributes to
facilitate the effects of all the principles, which we shall explain
in the progress of this Treatise. For 'tis evident, that if a person,
full grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden
transported into our world, he would be very much embarrassed with
every object, and would not readily find what degree of love or hatred,
pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it.
The passions are often varied by very inconsiderable principles; and
these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the
first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all
these principles, and have settled the just value of every thing; this
must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and
guide us, by means of general established maxims, in the proportions
we ought to observe in preferring one object to another. This remark
may, perhaps, serve to obviate difficulties that may arise concerning
some causes which I shall hereafter ascribe to particular passions,
and which may be esteemed too refined to operate so universally and
certainly as they are found to do. I shall close this subject with a
reflection derived from these five limitations. This reflection is,
that the persons who are proudest, and who, in the eye of the world,
have most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest; nor
the most humble always the most miserable, as may at first sight be
imagined from this system. An evil may be real, though its cause has
no relation to us: it may be real, without being peculiar: it may be
real without showing itself to others: it may be real, without being
constant: and it may be real, without falling under the general rules.
Such evils as these will not fail to render us miserable, though they
have little tendency to diminish pride: and perhaps the most real and
the most solid evils of life will be found of this nature.
[2] Part. II. Sect. 4.
SECTION VII.
OF VICE AND VIRTUE.
Taking these limitations along with us, let us proceed to examine the
causes of pride and humility, and see whether in every case we can
discover the double relations by which they operate on the passions.
If we find that all these causes are related to self, and produce a
pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion, there will remain no
farther scruple with regard to the present system. We shall principally
endeavour to prove the latter point, the former being in a manner
self-evident.
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