Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
Lest those arguments should not appear entirely conclusive (as I think
they are), I shall have recourse to authority, and shall prove, from
the universal consent of mankind, that the obligation of submission to
government is not derived from any promise of the subjects. Nor need
any one wonder, that though I have all along endeavoured to establish
my system on pure reason, and have scarce ever cited the judgment even
of philosophers or historians on any article, I should now appeal to
popular authority, and oppose the sentiments of the rabble to any
philosophical reasoning. For it must be observed, that the opinions of
men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in
a great measure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil
is founded on the pleasure or pain which results from the view of any
sentiment or character; and, as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown
to the person who feels it, it follows,[10] that there is just so much
vice or virtue in any character as every one places in it, and that
'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. And, though
our judgments concerning the _origin_ of any vice or virtue, be not so
certain as those concerning their _degrees_, yet, since the question in
this case regards not any philosophical origin of an obligation, but a
plain matter of fact, 'tis not easily conceived how we can fall into
an error. A man who acknowledges himself to be bound to another for
a certain sum, must certainly know whether it be by his own bond, or
that of his father; whether it be of his mere good will, or for money
lent him; and under what conditions, and for what purposes, he has
bound himself. In like manner, it being certain that there is a moral
obligation to submit to government, because everyone thinks so; it must
be as certain that this obligation arises not from a promise; since no
one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict adherence to
a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that
origin. Neither magistrates nor subjects have formed this idea of our
civil duties.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account