Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
All this is easily applied to the present subject. We sink very much
in our own eyes when in the presence of a great man, or one of a
superior genius; and this humility makes a considerable ingredient in
that _respect_ which we pay our superiors, according to our foregoing
reasonings on that passion.[4] Sometimes even envy and hatred arise
from the comparison; but in the greatest part of men, it rests at
respect and esteem. As sympathy has such a powerful influence on the
human mind, it causes pride to have in some measure the same effect as
merit; and, by making us enter into those elevated sentiments which the
proud man entertains of himself, presents that comparison, which is so
mortifying and disagreeable. Our judgment does not entirely accompany
him in the flattering conceit in which he pleases himself; but still
is so shaken as to receive the idea it presents, and to give it an
influence above the loose conceptions of the imagination. A man who,
in an idle humour, would form a notion of a person of a merit very
much superior to his own, would not be mortified by that fiction: but
when a man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit, is
presented to us; if we observe in him any extraordinary degree of pride
and self-conceit, the firm persuasion he has of his own merit, takes
hold of the imagination, and diminishes us in our own eyes, in the same
manner as if he were really possessed of all the good qualities which
he so liberally attributes to himself. Our idea is here precisely in
that medium which is requisite to make it operate on us by comparison.
Were it accompanied with belief, and did the person appear to have
the same merit which he assumes to himself, it would have a contrary
effect, and would operate on us by sympathy. The influence of that
principle would then be superior to that of comparison, contrary to
what happens where the person's merit seems below his pretensions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account