Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
The necessary consequence of these principles is, that pride, or
an overweening conceit of ourselves, must be vicious; since it
causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a
disagreeable comparison. 'Tis a trite observation in philosophy, and
even in common life and conversation, that 'tis our own pride, which
makes us so much displeased with the pride of other people; and that
vanity becomes insupportable to us merely because we are vain. The gay
naturally associate themselves with the gay, and the amorous with the
amorous; but the proud never can endure the proud, and rather seek the
company of those who are of an opposite disposition. As we are all of
us proud in some degree, pride is universally blamed and condemned
by all mankind, as having a natural tendency to cause uneasiness in
others by means of comparison. And this effect must follow the more
naturally, that those, who have an ill-grounded conceit of themselves,
are for ever making those comparisons; nor have they any other method
of supporting their vanity. A man of sense and merit is pleased with
himself, independent of all foreign considerations; but a fool must
always find some person that is more foolish, in order to keep himself
in good humour with his own parts and understanding.
But though an overweening conceit of our own merit be vicious and
disagreeable, nothing can be more laudable than to have a value for
ourselves, where we really have qualities that are valuable. The
utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of
virtue, as well as its agreeableness to others; and 'tis certain, that
nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree
of pride, which makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a
confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprises. Whatever
capacity any one may be endowed with, 'tis entirely useless to him, if
he be not acquainted with it, and form not designs suitable to it. 'Tis
requisite on all occasions to know our own force; and were it allowable
to err on either side, 'twould be more advantageous to over-rate our
merit, than to form ideas of it below its just standard. Fortune
commonly favours the bold and enterprising; and nothing inspires us
with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves.
Add to this, that though pride, or self-applause, be sometimes
disagreeable to others, 'tis always agreeable to ourselves; as, on the
other hand, modesty, though it give pleasure to every one who observes
it, produces often uneasiness in the person endowed with it. Now, it
has been observed, that our own sensations determine the vice and
virtue of any quality, as well as those sensations, which it may excite
in others.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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