Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
It has been observed, in treating of the understanding, that the
distinction which we sometimes make betwixt a _power_ and the
_exercise_ of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any
other being ought ever to be thought possessed of any ability, unless
it be exerted and put in action. But though this be strictly true in
a just and _philosophical_ way of thinking, 'tis certain it is not
_the philosophy_ of our passions, but that many things operate upon
them by means of the idea and supposition of power, independent of
its actual exercise. We are pleased when we acquire an ability of
procuring pleasure, and are displeased when another acquires a power of
giving pain. This is evident from experience; but in order to give a
just explication of the matter, and account for this satisfaction and
uneasiness, we must weigh the following reflections.
'Tis evident the error of distinguishing power from its exercise
proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of _free will_,
which, indeed, enters very little into common life, and has but small
influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking. According to
that doctrine, motives deprive us not of free-will, nor take away our
power of performing or forbearing any action. But according to common
notions a man has no power, where very considerable motives lie betwixt
him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forbear
what he wishes to perform. I do not think I have fallen into my enemy's
power when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side,
while I am, unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil
magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as
perfect safety as if he were chained or imprisoned. But when a person
acquires such an authority over me, that not only there is no external
obstacle to his actions, but also that he may punish or reward me as he
pleases without any dread of punishment in his turn, I then attribute a
full power to him, and consider myself as his subject or vassal.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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