Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
But though the causes of pride and humility be plainly _natural_, we
shall find, upon examination, that they are not _original_, and that
'tis utterly impossible they should each of them be adapted to these
passions by a particular provision and primary constitution of nature.
Beside their prodigious number, many of them are the effects of art,
and arise partly from the industry, partly from the caprice, and partly
from the good fortune of men. Industry produces houses, furniture,
clothes. Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities. And
good fortune frequently contributes to all this, by discovering the
effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations
of bodies. 'Tis absurd therefore to imagine, that each of these was
foreseen and provided for by nature, and that every new production
of art, which causes pride or humility, instead of adapting itself
to the passion by partaking of some general quality that naturally
operates on the mind, is itself the object of an original principle,
which till then lay concealed in the soul, and is only by accident
at last brought to light. Thus the first mechanic that invented a
fine scrutoire, produced pride in him who became possessed of it, by
principles different from those which made him proud of handsome chairs
and tables. As this appears evidently ridiculous, we must conclude,
that each cause of pride and humility is not adapted to the passions
by a distinct original quality, but that there are some one or more
circumstances common to all of them, on which their efficacy depends.
Besides, we find in the course of nature, that though the effects be
many, the principles from which they arise are commonly but few and
simple, and that 'tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have
recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different
operation. How much more must this be true with regard to the human
mind, which, being so confined a subject, may justly be thought
incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles, as would
be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility, were each
distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles!
Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural,
with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus. The ancients,
though sensible of that maxim, _that Nature does nothing in vain_,
contrived such intricate systems of the heavens, as seemed inconsistent
with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple
and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every
new phenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our
hypothesis with a variety of this kind, are certain proofs that none of
these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number
of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.
SECTION IV.
OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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