Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at CambridgeRashdall, Hastings
Religion
Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge
Rashdall, Hastings
Christianity; Philosophy and religion
Now, the question arises--'Can such an objectivity be asserted by those
who take a purely materialistic or naturalistic view of the Universe?'
Whatever our metaphysical theories about the nature of Reality may be,
we can in practice have no difficulty in the region of Physical Science
about recognizing an objective reality of some kind which is other than
my mere thinking about it. That fire will burn whether I think so or
not is practically recognized by persons of all metaphysical
persuasions. If I say 'I can cloy the hungry edge of appetite by bare
imagination of a feast,' I try the experiment, and I fail. I imagine
the feast, but I am hungry still: and if I persist in the experiment, I
die. But what do we mean when we say that things are right or wrong
whether I think them so or not, that the Moral Law exists outside me
and independently of my thinking about it? Where and how does this
moral law exist? The physical laws of Nature may be supposed by the
Materialist or the Realist somehow to exist in matter: to the
Metaphysician there may be difficulties in such a view, but the
difficulties are not obvious to common-sense. But surely (whatever may
be thought about physical laws) the moral law, {74} which expresses not
any matter of physical fact but what _ought_ to be thought of acts,
cannot be supposed to exist in a purely material Universe. An 'ought'
can exist only in and for a mind. In what mind, then, does the moral
law exist? As a matter of fact, different people's moral judgements
contradict one another. And the consciousness of no living man can
well be supposed to be a flawless reflection of the absolute moral
ideal. On a non-theistic view of the Universe, then, the moral law
cannot well be thought of as having any actual existence. The
objective validity of the moral law can indeed be and no doubt is
_asserted_, believed in, acted upon without reference to any
theological creed; but it cannot be defended or fully justified without
the pre-supposition of Theism. What we mean by an objective law is
that the moral law is a part of the ultimate nature of things, on a
level with the laws of physical nature, and it cannot be _that_, unless
we assume that law to be an expression of the same mind in which
physical laws originate. The idea of duty, when analysed, implies the
idea of God. Whatever else Plato meant by the 'idea of the good,' this
at least was one of his meanings--that the moral law has its source in
the source of all Reality.
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