No; the intelligent individual will give allegiance to the group of
which he happens to find himself a member, only so far as the policies
of the group accord with his own criticised desires. Whatever
allegiance he offers will be to those forces, wherever they may be,
which in his judgment move in the line of these desires. Even for such
forces he will not sacrifice himself,--though there may be times when
martyrdom is a luxury for which life itself is not too great a price.
Since these forces have been defined in terms of his own judgment and
desire, conflict between them and himself can come only when his
behavior diverges from the purposes defined and resumed in times of
conscious thought,--_i.e._, only when he ceases to adapt means to his
ends, ceases, that is, to be intelligent. The prime moral conflict is
not between the individual and his group, but between the partial self
of fragmentary impulse and the coördinated self of conscious purpose.
There is a group within each man as well as without: a group of partial
selves is the reality behind the figment of the unitary self. Every
individual is a society, every person is a crowd. And the tragedies of
the moral life lie not in the war of each against all, but in the
restless interplay of these partial selves behind the stage of action.
As a man’s intelligence grows this conflict diminishes, for both means
and ends, both behavior and purposes, are being continually revised and
redirected in accordance with intelligence, and therefore in convergence
towards it. Progressively the individual achieves unity, and through
unity, personality. Faith in himself has made him whole. The ethical
problem, so far as it is the purely individual problem of attaining to
coördinated personality, is solved.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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