Under the title of _fundamental faculties_, Gall confounds all things together—the passions, the instinct, the intellectual faculties. These faculties, which are at the basis of his whole philosophy, he knows not even how to denominate them. He calls them instincts,[79] inclinations, senses, memories, &c. There is a memory or sense of things, a memory or sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct that leads certain animals to live in elevated regions with pride, which is a moral sentiment in man;[80] the carnivorous instinct with courage;[81] he believes that conscience, (which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing but a modification of a particular sense, the sense of benevolence, &c.[82] The hesitation of his mind is visible every where. “I leave it to the reader,” says he, “to decide whether the fundamental faculty to which this penchant relates, should be denominated sense of elevation, self-esteem,” &c.[83] “To speak correctly,” continues he, “firmness is neither a penchant nor a faculty; it is a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive quality, which is called character.”[84] Finally, he writes the following paragraph, perhaps the most singular one that he ever wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner how little confidence he had in his own psycology. “If we are materialists because we do not admit the existence of a unit-faculty of the soul, but recognise several primitive faculties, we ask whether the ordinary division of the faculties of the soul into understanding, will, attention, memory, judgment, imagination, and affections and passions, expresses nothing more than a primitive unit-faculty? If it be asserted that all these faculties are merely modifications of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder us from making the same assertion as to the faculties whose existence we do admit.”[85] To be sure, nothing prevents you. Or rather every thing constrains you to do so. There is therefore one sole faculty, of which all the other faculties are but moods. You return then to the common philosophy, and consequently you no longer possess a peculiar philosophy. The problem proposed by Gall is at the same time physiological, psycological, and anatomical. In our first article an account has been given of Gall’s _physiology_, and it has been shown to be generally disproved by direct experiment. In the present one his _psycology_ has been examined, and it is confuted by the consciousness (_le sens intime_). It only remains for us now to examine his _anatomy_. III. OF GALL. THE ORGANS. Of all Gall’s writings, his anatomy is that which has been most talked of, and yet it is the part least known.