According to Gall, every thing between an organ of a sense and an organ of a faculty, between a faculty and sense, is similar. A faculty is a sense. His words are: the _memory or the sense of things_, the _memory or the sense of persons_, the _memory or the sense of numbers_. He talks of the _sense of language_, the _sense of mechanics_, the _sense of the relations of colours_, &c. &c. “As we must admit,” says he, “five different external senses, since their functions are essentially different, ... so we must agree, after all, to acknowledge the different faculties and the different inclinations as being essentially different moral and intellectual forces, and likewise connected with organic apparatuses, which are special to each and independent of each other.”[94] “Who,” says he, “can dare to say that sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, are simple modifications of faculties? Who could dare to derive them from a single and same source, from a single and same organ? In the same way, the twenty-seven qualities and faculties which I recognise as fundamental or primary forces, ... cannot be regarded as the simple modifications of any one faculty.”[95] On the one hand, Gall gives to the _faculties_ all the independence of the _senses_; and on the other, he gives the _senses_ all the attributes of the _faculties_. “Here,” says he, “are new reasons why I have always maintained in my public discourses, though these assertions are in opposition to the ideas that prevail among philosophers, that each organ of a sense possesses absolutely its own functions; that each of these organs has its peculiar faculty of receiving and even of perceiving impressions, its own conscience, its own faculty of reminiscence,”[96] &c. Gall did not foresee that a physiological experiment (and a very sure one it is) would one day demonstrate that the sense receives the impression but does not perceive it, and that, consequently, it is endowed neither with _conscience_ nor _reminiscence_, &c. When the cerebral lobes or hemispheres[97] are removed from an animal, the animal immediately loses its sight. And yet nothing, as regards the eyes themselves, has been changed; objects continue to be depicted upon the retina, the iris retains its contractility, and the optic nerve its excitability. The retina continues to be sensible of light, for the iris contracts or dilates according as the light admitted to it is more or less intense. No change has taken place as to the structure of the eye, and yet the animal does not see! Therefore it is not the eye that perceives, nor is it the eye that sees.[98] The eye does not see; it is the understanding that sees by means of the eyes.[99] When Gall concludes from the independence of the external senses to the independence of the faculties of the soul, he confounds, as to the sense itself, two things that are essentially distinct, impression and perception. Impression is multiple; perception is single.