Broussais ought not to be judged of by his “Cours de Phrénologie.”[163] The five or six first _lessons_, or, as he calls them, _generalities_,[164] are merely a confused mixture of ideas: the notions of Condillac rejected by Cabanis, and the ideas of the phrenologists. He says that sensibility is the _common origin_ of the faculties;[165] he calls _perception_ a _primary faculty_,[166] &c. &c.; and Condillac would not speak differently. But, on the other hand, he says that there are as many _memories_ as there are organs;[167] that the instincts and the sentiments possess a memory, as the _external perceptions_[168] have theirs; that the mind is the _sum of the faculties_,[169] &c.; and Gall could not say it more clearly. Broussais is particularly opposed to the _moi_ of Descartes. “Seduced,” says he, “by the _moi_ of Descartes, philosophers have been led to reason according to the testimony of their consciousness....”[170] And according to what testimony does Broussais think they ought to reason? He thinks it very funny to call the _moi_ an _intra-cranial entity_,[171] _intra-cranial central being_,[172] _person_ par excellence, &c.[173] He laughs at the _moi_ of Descartes; he forgets that the _moi_ of Gall is either nothing else than the sum (_ensemble_) of the intellectual faculties, or nothing else than a word; and he makes for himself a _peculiar moi_,[174] which he locates in the organ of _comparison_. “We owe,” says he, “to the organ of general comparison the distinction of one person expressed by the sign _me_.”[175] Broussais was never designed for compliance with the ideas of others; a yoke oppresses him; he is never truly Broussais, except in the midst of conflict. In 1816 he publishes a volume,[176] and the medical doctrines are shook for half a century: we ought to read that volume over again, and forget the “Cours de Phrénologie.” VI. BROUSSAIS’S PSYCOLOGY. The fact is, Broussais is busier with his own opinions than with what Gall thought; and here is a specimen of his way of thinking: “The understanding and its different manifestations are,” says he, “the phenomena of the nervous actions.”[177] “The faculties,” says he further, “are the actions of the material organs,”[178] &c. Broussais’s whole psycology is contained in these words. The organ, and the phenomenon produced by the organ. To speak more clearly, the organ and the action of the organ. To speak like Cabanis, the organ and the _secretion_ of the organ, or _thought_.[179] That’s all! The understanding, therefore, is merely a _phenomenon_, a product, an act. But if this be the case, how can there be a _continuity of the moi_? Now, the consciousness which gives me the _unity_ of the _moi_, gives me not less assuredly the _continuity_ of the _moi_. Descartes’ admirable words are: “I find that there is in us an _intellectual memory_.”[180]