“I cannot agree with the assertion that this error (the error caused by the bent appearance of a stick partly plunged into water,) is not corrected by the understanding but by the touch; for, although the sense in question makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet that cannot correct the error of vision; but furthermore, it is requisite that reason should teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our judgment after touching, than to the judgment that we come to after using our eyes; but this reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but to the understanding alone; and in this very example, it is the understanding that corrects the error of the sense.”[14] The brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the soul; and all sensation, even those operations that appear to depend upon the simple external sense, is function of the soul. Gall falls back upon Condillac, who, much less rigorous in this particular than Descartes, says, that “all our faculties proceed from the senses.”[15] But when Condillac speaks thus, he evidently speaks by ellipsis, for he immediately adds these words: “The senses are only occasional causes. They do not feel; it is the soul that alone feels, through the medium of the organs.”[16] Now, if it be the _soul_ only that feels, _à fortiori_, it is the soul only that _remembers_, that _judges_, that _imagines_, &c. _Memory_, _judgment_, _imagination_, &c., in a word, all our faculties, are therefore of the soul, and therefore come from the soul, and not from the senses. There is no philosopher who has exaggerated more than Helvetius the influence of the senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius says, “In whatsoever manner we interrogate experience, she always answers that any greater or lesser superiority of mind is independent of any greater or lesser perfection of the senses.”[17]