Physical science in the time of Nero : $b being a translation of the Quaestiones naturales of SenecaSeneca, Lucius Annaeus
Philosophy
Physical science in the time of Nero : $b being a translation of the Quaestiones naturales of Seneca
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus
Comets; Earthquakes; Meteorology -- Early works to 1800
People are convinced that lightning possesses sovereign power, 1
because its occurrence destroys the force of other portents. On the
other hand, whatever it portends is regarded as unalterable, and the
appearance of no other omen lessens its import. Anything threatened
by unfavourable entrails or inauspicious birds will be cancelled by
favourable lightning. But any warning given by lightning cannot be
defeated by opposing entrail or omen. Now this belief seems to me
mistaken. My reason? Simply that nothing can be truer than the truth. 2
If birds have truly foretold the future, the omen cannot be nullified
by lightning: if it can, then it was not a true prophecy the birds
uttered. It is not bird and lightning whose force I am here comparing,
but two revelations of truth, which must be equal in authority if
they are equally intimations of truth. Therefore, if the occurrence
of lightning destroys the indications given by priests or augurs,
there must have been a flaw in the inspection of the entrails or the
observation of the auguries. It is not a question of which of the 3
two kinds of omen possesses the more exalted or powerful character:
if both have furnished indications of truth, they are so far equal.
You would be quite justified in asserting that the power of flame
was greater than that of smoke; but flame has just the same power as
smoke, and no more, in giving indication of the existence of fire. So
if the statement is confined to the assertion of the greater authority
of lightning on occasions when the entrails give one indication and
lightning a different one, I shall perhaps agree. But if the statement
go on to affirm that although other signs have foretold the truth, 4
yet the lightning stroke has destroyed all that went before and claims
credit only for itself, then the statement is untrue. And for this
reason: the mere number of the auspices makes no difference. Fate is
but one. If it was rightly understood through the first auspice, it
is not destroyed through the second; it remains just the same. And so
I say again it does not matter whether the means of our inquiry (=
auspice) is the same or different, since the object of the inquiry
remains the same.
XXXV
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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