Fate cannot be changed by lightning. And why? Lightning is itself 1 a part of fate. Well, then, it may be asked, what is the good of expiation and atonement if the fates are immutable? Let me uphold the rigid sect that takes exception to such rites and regards vows as but comfort to a breast ill at ease. The fates perform their function in a far different way from that supposed; they are not moved by any prayer nor changed by pity nor by favour. The course they hold is irrevocable; once they have entered upon it they flow on by unalterable decree. 2 As the water of rushing cataracts returns not upon itself, nor yet lingers, since each succeeding wave drives headlong that which went before; so the order of events is rolled on by the eternal succession of fate, whose first law it is to abide by its decrees. XXXVI For what is one to understand as meant by fate? I suppose it is the 1 binding necessity of all events and actions, a necessity that no force can break. If you believe that such a power can be prevailed upon to change through sacrifice or the head of a snow-white lamb, you know little about the Divine dispensation. You say that even a wise man 2 does not change his mind: how much less is God a man that he should change? Even the wise man knows what is best under present conditions; to the Divine wisdom everything is present. Still, I wish, for the moment, to advocate the views of those who hold that atonement should be made for lightning, and who have no doubt that expiation is of avail, now to remove dangers, now to mitigate them, now to delay them. XXXVII In a little I will follow up what I have said and show the 1 consequences involved. Meantime we have so much in common with the persons last mentioned in holding that vows are of service, but without prejudice to the power and sway of fate. Some things are, in fact, left by the immortal gods in such a state of suspense as to turn to the advantage of worshippers if they employ prayer to heaven and take vows upon them. This, then, is so far from being opposed to fate that it is actually a part of fate. But my opponent argues thus: an event is either going or is not going to take place. If it is going to, then 2 it will take place, even though you take no vows upon you. If it is not going to, then it won’t, even though you take the vows. The dilemma, I reply, is no valid one: you overlook an alternative that lies between those horns of yours. This, say I, will take place, but not unless vows have been taken upon those concerned. This, too, one may say, must be included in the order of fate, either that you undertake the vows or that you do not. XXXVIII