Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for
yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or
injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken
in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from
the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best:
no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at
draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt
it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had
any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are
competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree
or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every
one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also
which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely
about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are
the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer?
_Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude
differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not
competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now,
about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of
one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They
differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy
each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about
health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the
multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely
dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that
we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that
they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who
have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say,
it is impossible.
[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai,
kai\ e)gô\ ô(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ tô=n pollô=n.]]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\
dê\? nu=n peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\
pragma/tôn, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s
ê)\ a)llê/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: Ê(/kista, nê\ Di/', ô)=
Sô/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)tô=n
diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]]
_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what
_you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give
all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that
Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes
himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he
does not know himself?
[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.]
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